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Towards a theory of action in Sartre’s philosophy.  
From action to ethics 
André BARATA 
(University of Beira Interior, Portugal) 
(LABCOM.IFP – Communication, Philosophy, Humanities) 
In this reading, I will approach what could be argued as the core of a 
theory of action in Jean-Paul Sartre’s thought, tackling its ethical 
implications. Throughout the analysis, I will outline elements that allow for 
an integrated perspective of Sartre’s ethical thought. I will explore a few 
significant passages, mainly from Sartre’s masterpiece – L’Être et le Néant, 
his phenomenological ontology of 1943 – and occasionally from other 
works, both earlier and later. 
My examination stems from two ontological considerations and 
develops along a set of points primarily delineating a Sartrean theory of 
action and ultimately a Sartrean ethics. These two underlying premises 
pertain to Sartre’s thought on freedom and will, both quite originally defined 
from his phenomenological point of view. Both also frame the ensuing 
critical thoughts on Sartre’s theory of action and Sartre’s ethics.  
I. Freedom, not free will 
It is perhaps wisest to begin by precluding a misinterpretation of 
Sartre’s understanding of freedom. For Sartre, freedom is ontological, which 
means that it is the very being of consciousness, of the for-itself (pour-soi). 
Conscious grasping of this free condition comes about through the 
experience of angst (angoisse).  
This suggests at least two things: first, that Sartre’s concept of freedom 
does not fit any of the usual options in the philosophical debate on free will. 
Sartre is admittedly not a determinist who proposes that present mental states 
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would be caused by preceding mental states. On the contrary, for Sartre, 
present consciousness is determined only by itself, in its very presence. He 
sees past consciousness as inert, void of power to determine present 
consciousness. Might he instead be a compatibilist, believing determinism to 
be compatible with free will? He is not a compatibilist either, as that position 
implies an acceptance of determinism. The compatibilist perspective 
assumes the truth of determinism and investigates the role of free will in a 
deterministic world. But, precisely, determinism is outright rejected by 
Sartre. And he rejects it not merely the sense in which different effects could 
follow from the same causes, but from a more radical perspective whereby 
no cause/effect relation whatsoever is relevant to the phenomena of 
consciousness. Neither determinist, nor compatibilist, Sartre is no libertarian 
either on the matter of free will. According to the libertarian view, the 
admission of free will implies a refusal of determinism. While Sartre would 
agree that freedom implies such a refusal (at least as regards subjective 
existence), he quite simply does not equate freedom with free will. In fact, 
for Sartre, freedom as an ontological concept is rather removed from the idea 
of free will. Consciousness is free regardless of human will. Freedom is a 
transcendental condition for conscious being. That is not, for Sartre, the case 




II. Will is witness, not agent 
 
The second consideration is related to the agential status of will. Yet 
again, Sartre disagrees with the more obvious representations. Namely, that 
of will (free or otherwise) as determining one’s choice, deliberation and 
action. For Sartre, when will comes into play, “les jeux sont faits”, evoking 
Julius Caesar’s Alea iacta est, the die is cast.  
In so considering will, Sartre diverges from a traditional representation 
of human action according to which, since action is rational, it is primarily 
determined by the reflective subject in a deliberative process involving            
will. For the existentialist, action is determined subjectively, through and by 
the very living of consciousness. But, according to Sartre’s phenomenology, 
in reflection mode consciousness cannot be a direct agent. In reflection, 
consciousness merely witnesses reflected consciousness, becoming aware of 
choices lived in that reflected consciousness. This collides with traditional 
perspectives on the powers of deliberation. But, more significantly, it also 
signals something of a Copernican revolution. Indeed, what Sartre proposes 
is to shift human reflection from a stance of agency to a stance of awareness. 
And this shift resonates significantly in another Copernican-like revolution 
down the line, from a distinct angle. I refer to António Damásio’s inflection 
of the traditional relation between emotions and feelings. Damásio critiques 
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the traditional representation of the relation between emotion and feeling, 
whereby an inner and private feeling is understood to cause a visible, even 
public, emotion. In Looking for Spinoza (2003)1, Damásio exemplifies this 
representation with a quote from Shakespeare’s Richard II: 
Say that again. 
The shadow of my sorrow! ha! let's see: 
'Tis very true, my grief lies all within; 
And these external manners of laments 
Are merely shadows to the unseen grief 
That swells with silence in the tortured soul; 
 
In a way parallel to Sartre’s understanding of will, Damásio puts 
forward that it is not emotions that are the shadows of feelings, but the other 
way around. It is feelings, rather, that are the shadows of emotions, in that 
the former are a conscious perception of the latter. Of course, there is at least 
one important difference between these two revolutions – for Damásio, 
consciousness is not a direct role player, whereas for Sartre consciousness 
certainly is the direct and actually the sole role player of human agency. In 
the end, both Sartre and Damásio advance a similar claim: that a voluntarist 
and intellectualised centrality needs to be demystified in our subjective 
living. Although emotional living is necessarily conscious for one but not for 
the other, both authors posit that emotional living has significant priority 
over reflective consciousness. 
These two facts – an ontological freedom that must be distinguished 
from free will, and a reflective will that must be distinguished from the 
subjectivity that determines action – are obviously decisive in Sartre’s 
conceptualisation of human action, as we will see. 
 
 
III. Motives and mobiles 
 
In the chapter on will and freedom of L’Être et le Néant, Sartre discerns 
a difference between motives and mobiles of action. That difference is 
established along the following lines:  
 The motive is the reason for action, is objective, and is independent of 
the subjective aspects of action.  
                                                     
1. “We tend to believe that the hidden is the source of the expressed. Besides, we know that           
as far as the mind is concerned, feeling is what really counts. ‘There lies the substance,’ says 
Richard, speaking of his hidden grief, and we agree. We suffer or delight from actual feelings. 
In the narrow sense, emotions are externalities. But ‘principal’ does not mean ‘first’ and does 
not mean ‘causative.’ The centrality of feeling obscures the matter of how feelings arise               
and favors the view that somehow feelings occur first and are expressed subsequently in 
emotions.” (Damásio, 2003: 29)  
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“On entend ordinairement par motif la raison d’un acte ; c’est-à-dire 
l’ensemble des considérations rationnelles qui le justifient. (Sartre, 1943: 522) 
“Certes, le motif est objectif : c’est l’état de choses contemporain, tel qu’il 
se dévoile à une conscience.” (Sartre, 1943: 524)  
 
 And the mobile is the set of desires, emotions, and passions that drive 
a subjectivity to perform an action. 
“Le mobile, au contraire, est considéré ordinairement comme un fait 
subjectif. C’est l’ensemble des désirs, des émotions et des passions qui me 
poussent à accomplir un certain acte.” (Sartre, 1943: 522) 
 
Will indeed contains motives or reasons to act, but Sartre has shifted it 
to an exclusively reflective plane of awareness. Thus motives, while 
perceived within the realm of will, only appear in reference to a project 
which gives meaning to an action determined elsewhere (rather than 
determining action directly from a reflective position, as deliberation would 
make us suppose). It is this project – where motives are aspects of the world 
implied in the project – that is pictured in will, through reflection. 
Motives are seen only in light of an end, a project of being. Each motive 
is a certain objective structure of the world, dependent on a certain point of 
view, the point of view of a certain project towards which the world is 
mobilised. 
These ideas must not, however, lead us to believe that motives have 
nothing to do with action activation and that action is entirely determined 
through subjective, internal mobiles. Sartre is very clear on this issue, stating 
that to the positional awareness of motives or reasons to act in reflection 
corresponds a non-thetic self-consciousness as mobile – a more or less 
passionate project towards an end. Motives and mobiles are, in fact, 
correlative, and both refer to the ends of a project: mobiles as a non-thetic 
living of the motives. 
“Ainsi motif et mobile sont corrélatifs, exactement comme la conscience 
non-thétique (de) soi est le corrélatif ontologique de la conscience thétique                 
de l’objet. De même que la conscience de quelque chose est conscience (de) 
soi, de même le mobile n’est rien d’autre que la saisie du motif en tant que cette 
saisie est conscience (de) soi. Mais il s’ensuit évidemment que le motif et la fin 
sont les trois termes indissolubles du jaillissement d’une conscience vivante               
et libre.” (Sartre, 1943: 525-6) 
 
This means three other things: 
 Firstly, that Sartre departs from the traditional opposition – easily 
conceived as a psychological or even moral conflict – between an action 
determined by motives or reasons to act and an action determined by 
passionate and emotional mobiles. Reasons or motives do not determine 
action, except in the sense that they are the reverse side of a complex 
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motive/mobile. At the same time, mobiles only have meaning in relation to a 
world articulated through motives. 
 Secondly, that motives, though the content of will, are not based on 
will. Unreflective action necessarily has both mobiles and motives, even in 
the absence of will’s perception of motives. This position echoes the famous 
quotation above – when will appears, the die has already been cast, “les jeux 
sont faits”. The precedence is unequivocal: even objective motives precede 
their reflective appropriation into will. 
“L’acte volontaire se distingue de la spontanéité non volontaire en ce que 
la seconde est conscience purement irréfléchie des motifs à travers le projet pur 
et simple de l’acte. Pour le mobile, dans l’acte irréfléchi, il n’est point objet 
pour lui-même mais simple conscience non-positionnelle (de) soi. La structure 
de l’acte volontaire, au contraire, exige l’apparition d’une conscience réflexive 
que saisit le mobile comme quasi-objet (…).” (Sartre, 1943: 527-8)  
 
 Thirdly – and despite the illusory or feigned nature of voluntary 
deliberation (“toujours truquée”), it remains meaningful, holding an indirect 
function in determining action. When mobiles need to be grasped in a 
transcendent way. 
“Quand je délibère, les jeux sont faits. Et si je dois en venir à délibérer, 
c’est simplement parce qu’il entre dans mon projet original de me rendre 
compte des mobiles par la délibération plutôt que par telle ou telle autre forme 
de découverte (par la passion, par exemple, ou tout simplement par l’action, 
que révèle l’ensemble organisé des motifs et des fins comme mon langage 
m’apprend ma pensée). Il y a donc un choix de la délibération comme procédé 
qui m’annoncera ce que je projette, et par suite ce que je suis. Et le choix                  
de la délibération est organisé avec l’ensemble mobiles-motifs et fin par la 
spontanéité libre. Quand la volonté intervient, la décision est prise et elle n’a 
d’autre valeur que celle d’une annonciatrice.” (Sartre, 1943: 527) 
 
 
IV. Internalism versus externalism, but differently 
 
Sartrean distinctions between mobiles and motives can be contrasted 
with Bernard Williams’ distinction between internal and external reasons of 
action. According to Williams, reasons for acting are exclusively internal 
reasons, i.e., reasons contained in one’s subjective motivational set. A 
presumably external reason to do something only determines one’s doing so 
if that is also wanted. But that does not necessarily mean that only internal 
reasons can be reasons for action. It is one thing to recognise that only 
internal reasons can determine action, but quite another to suppose that all 
relevant reasons must be internal. Bernard Williams uses a kind of Occam’s 
razor, cutting external reasons out due to the fact that only internal reasons 
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can determine action. However, one could discriminate between, on the one 
hand, internal reasons that make us act in a certain way; and, on the other 
hand, a deeper motivation, not directly related with one’s wants, desires, and 
beliefs, yet, nevertheless, influencing one’s wants, desires and beliefs. If 
Williams’ point was merely that those external reasons are not able to 
determine action, even an externalist would agree. If Williams’ point was 
that those external reasons have no power to determine action directly (i.e., 
determining power assumed in internal reasons), then it is the case that the 
externalist point of view is rejected. And I would agree. But, even assuming 
that refusal of externalism, it is not clear that Williams could state that there 
are only internal reasons. And it is precisely in this context that I find a 
confrontation with Sartre’s perspective to be useful. 
For Sartre, mobiles are the means through which action is possibly 
determined. But at the very same time, mobiles find correlation in motives, 
or reasons for action. A simple image is that subjective mobiles and 
objective motives are two sides of the same coin. Having one means having 
the other. Desires and wants, and whatever is active in Williams’ subjective 
motivational set, is active in the present consciousness of a living presence 
of the for-itself (pour-soi). For both Sartre and Williams, though not the 
same, there is one criterion that must be satisfied in order to determine 
action. And we can consider such a criterion an internalist concept of 
determination of human action. But here a significant difference must be 
emphasised. Wants and desires can count as internal for Sartre – not because 
they belong to a subjective motivational set, but only insofar as they remain 
present, always contemporary to the present of consciousness. Once they 
lose their place in the living present, they are neither lost for good, nor 
absolutely absent. That is why Sartre’s distinction between mobiles and 
motives is quite interesting. Externality and internality are not defined based 
on having or not having a relation with desires and wants, but on their being 
or not being in the present living. Employing words and concepts more 
familiar to Sartre, the criterion consists of transcending or not transcending 
consciousness. For him, it is crucial to be able to perform two 
phenomenological tasks: firstly, to recognise when the present of a 
consciousness is transcended; and, secondly, to identify the consequences 
that follow from that transcendence, both from the point of view of 
knowledge and from the point of view of determining action. 
 
 
V. Transcendence and action 
 
At this juncture, it is useful to recall an example Sartre deploys in his 
seminal La transcendance de l’Ego. Here the philosopher exemplifies with a 
lived experience of displeasure or repulse directed towards someone. An 
experience that Sartre refuses to identify with, or even assume to be 
necessarily motivated by, a psychological state, such as a feeling of hate, or 
a psychological quality, such as being a spiteful person. 
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Through a detailed analysis, Sartre realises that psychological “states” 
such as hatred or love are constituted only through reflection and in an 
unsure, doubtful way, unlike emotions such as attraction or repulsion. For 
example, I can be aware of repulsion and anger towards Peter and, however, 
not be sure that I hate him. The emotional immediacy of repulsion and anger 
does not extend to the psychological “states” of hatred. Indeed, adds Sartre, 
hatred is then a transcendent object that appears to me by the unreflected 
experience of disgust or repulsion (SARTRE, 1994). Psychological states – of 
which love and hate are examples – are objects that are transcendent to 
consciousness, revealing themselves both from an epistemic perspective, as 
fallible realities, and also from an existential perspective as inert realities, 
unable to make any determination in the life of consciousness. 
 
 
VI. Emotions and action 
 
The small revolution convened by Sartre would not be complete if it 
focused only on the movement of expelling psychological states and 
qualities from inner consciousness to transcendence. It was also necessary              
to reveal the crucially active aspect of emotions, which are not doomed to 
passive condition of expression. That is precisely what Sartre intended to do 
in the third and final part of his Sketch for a Theory of Emotions (Esquisse 
pour une théorie des émotions), where a perspective on emotional life of                  
a consciousness is given in terms of a transformation of how the world 
presents itself to a subject. 
The world presents itself to consciousness as obstacles and difficulties 
that must be overcome, always involving a coefficient of adversity. 
According to Sartre, emotions introduce an element of modulation to the 
meanings of how worldly objects present themselves to consciousness, 
softening, bypassing, or adapting to adversity. Sartre provides a very simple 
example of this plasticity: when perceiving that a bunch of grapes is not, 
after all, at hand, reachable, consciousness transforms its relationship with 
the world emotionally. The bunch of grapes becomes less attractive – now, it 
is just a bunch of unripe grapes. Consequently, the world’s adversity is 
mitigated by this emotional divestment. Another example: an emotion like 
joy is a foretaste of the fruition that the overcoming of distances and 
adversity will bring, and sadness translates an inhibited relationship to the 
world, thus inhibiting adversities that potentiate frustration. This plastic 
modulation changes not so much the world in its objective adversity, but the 
way we live it.  
Since it is not possible to isolate a meaning of the world or of part of it 
from a reference to a subject’s experience of it, and since it is not possible to 
speak of an adversity of the world except by reference to those who suffer 
such adversity, emotional life, according to Sartre, in fact introduces a 
magical ingredient to the relationships with the objects of the world. 
PHILONSORBONNE n° 12/Année 2017-18 132/186
VII. Teleologism of action, not of morals; Deontologism 
on ethics, but not Kantian 
 
Motives, mobiles, reasons, emotions, all considered, were all 
meaningless outside references to a project. This means that Sartre’s theory 
of action is a clear teleologism, and not a determinism, whichever kind we 
might consider. As the past has no power over the present, it excludes mental 
causation, as it excludes any other form of determinism over shifting 
consciousness. For instance, an unconscious drive of consciousness. This 
teleologism establishes a not-yet-existent future as value and as meaning           
of all motives and mobiles of action. An enlightening example by Sartre: 
“Le mobile ne se comprend que par la fin, c’est-à-dire par du non-existant, 
le mobile est donc en lui-même une négatité. Si j’accepte un salaire de misère, 
c’est sans doute par peur – et la peur est un mobile. Mais c’est peur de mourir 
de faim ; c’est-à-dire que cette peur n’a de sens que hors d’elle dans une fin 
posée idéalement qui est la conversation d’une vie que je saisis comme “en 
danger”. Et cette peur ne se comprend à son tour que par rapport à la valeur que 
je donne implicitement à cette vie, c’est-à-dire qu’elle se réfère à ce système 
hiérarchisé d’objets idéaux que sont les valeurs. Ainsi le mobile se fait 
apprendre ce qu’il est par l’ensemble des êtres qui “ne sont pas”, par les 
existences idéales et par l’avenir.” (Sartre, 1943: 512) 
 
But whereas I believe we can affirm that Sartre is committed to a 
teleological theory of action, even to a teleological ontology of human being 
(as the project is intrinsically ontological), I would not, however, subscribe 
to the point of view that, for those reasons, or any others, Sartre could 
sustain a teleological perspective on ethics. On the contrary, there are several 
elements that point to a Sartrean deontological perspective. But not as Kant 
conceptualises it. Not as a rule, an imperative, that should be obeyed by the 
will. If Sartre’s ethical perspectives can be approached as deontological, they 
must be founded on a rather different basis than the one present in Kant’s 
ethics. I will develop this hypothesis – namely, that there is a deontological 
ethic in Sartre, in spite of its irreducibility, even strangeness, to Kantian 
deontology.  
1. The rather famous example Sartre exposes in his conference Is 
Existentialism a Humanism? quite clearly reveals the Kantian ambition of 
giving a universal base to ethical decision, but with the significant difference 
of making the decision not a rule-obeying procedure, but a decision taken in 
a context of conflictual choice. Shortly put, radical choices, deep rooted in 
reality, instead of categorical imperatives, or any other ethics based on 
obeying a rule. In the example, the conflict is between the values related to 
caring for an ill mother who needs her son to be close-by, and the values 
related to the freedom of peoples in a context of war that requires men to 
fight far away from their homes. This is a radical choice in the sense that it 
organises all other choices. The radicality of the choice lies in the fact that            
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it does not have any roots in others’ choices that could support some of               
the weight of that choice. Sole subjectivity has to choose in a singular 
concrete situation that, at the same time, is as if it were for all men. In the 
words of Sartre:  
“La première démarche de l'existentialisme est de mettre tout homme                 
en possession de ce qu'il est et de faire reposer sur lui la responsabilité totale              
de son existence. Et, quand nous disons que l'homme est responsable de lui-
même, nous ne voulons pas dire que l'homme est responsable de sa stricte 
individualité, mais qu'il est responsable de tous les hommes.”  
[“The first step of existentialism is to put every man in possession of what 
it is to submit to the full responsibility of their existence. So when we say that 
man is responsible for himself, we don’t mean that man is only responsible for 
his strict individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.”] (Sartre, 
1946: 31)   
 
2. This universality obviously echoes Kantian categorical imperative. 
After all, Sartre, like Kant, aims at universality by declaring that by being 
responsible, actors are responsible for all men. But between the two 
perspectives there is a major difference, I would dare say a tremendous one. 
Kant restrains individual action to the (ethically required) imperative 
consideration of universality. Quite the opposite, for Sartre, universality is 
not a constraining condition but the co-extensive result – emerging from – of 
the radicality of singular choice. 
3. This point is illuminated by a reply Sartre gave to André Gorz in 
Sartre. Un film réalisé par Alexandre Astruc et Michel Contat, avec la 
participation de Simone de Beauvoir, Jacques Laurent-Bost et André Gorz, 
Jean Pouillon. Texte intégral. Paris: Gallimard, 1977. 
“J’ai toujours pensé que la moralité existait. Mais elle ne peut exister que 
dans des situations concrètes, donc elle suppose l’homme réellement engagé 
dans un monde et que l’on voie ce que devient la liberté dans ce monde. 
Autrement dit, la Critique de la raison dialectique est la suite de L’Être et le 
néant, et la morale ne peut venir qu’après. On peut la trouver dans Flaubert, par 
exemple.” (Sartre, 1977: 98) 
 
4. This also means that the subject of the singular universal, often 
emphasised as a core concept in the late phase of Sartre’s philosophy, does 
not mean a change so much as it means the achievement of a more exact and 
clear formulation for something that had been under consideration for 
decades.  
From the early 1960s, Sartre came to express this idea in the phrase 
‘singular universal’ and the reverse formulation ‘universal singular’. The 
idea, in summary, is that individuals reflect the universal features of their 
time and, conversely, that the universals of an age are realised concretely 
and singularly by individuals. (Crittenden, Paul, The Singular Universal 
in J.-P. Sartre, 31) 
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“Un homme n’est jamais un individu ; il vaudrait mieux l’appeler un 
universel singulier : totalisé et, par là même, universalisé par son époque, il la 
re-totalise en se reproduisant en elle comme singularité. Universel par 
l’universalité singulière de l’histoire humaine, singulier par la singularité 
universalisante de ses projets, il réclame d’être étudié simultanément par les 
deux bouts”  
[“For a man is never an individual; it would be more fitting to call him a 
universal singular. Summed up and for this reason universalised by his epoch, 
he in turn resumes it by reproducing himself in it as singularity. Universal, by 
the singular universality of human history. Singular, by the universalising 
singularity of his projects, he requires simultaneous examination from both 
ends.”] (Sartre, 1971: ix) 
 
5. Reinforcing the strong continuity between the Sartre of the early 40s 
and the Sartre of the 60s and 70s, it is interesting to remark a parallel 
between the call of Sartre into authenticity and, later, his defence of a 
progressive-regressive method. On the one hand, we know that authenticity, 
as a refusal of bad-faith, implies the movement of a living relation to a non-
assimilable transcendence. And, on the other hand, we also know that the 
progressive regressive method, as a refusal of a pratical-inert rigidification or 
reification, implies the movement of a living relation between one’s singular 
condition and one’s universal inscription.  
 
 
VIII. Character on ethics, but not following Aristotle 
 
Keeping in mind these remarks, it is important to emphasise another 
contrast, now with Aristotelian ethics. In fact, at least three major departures 
can be highlighted: 
1. While Aristotle emphasises a resting point, or a point of equilibrium 
achievable through his popularised “golden mean”, Sartre emphasises 
relentless, unstoppable movement both between the for-itself and the in-
itself and between the singular and the universal.  
2. While Aristotle estimates proiaresis as a deliberation that drives to a 
choice, and also estimates choices as a certain species that have voluntary 
acts as broader genus (Nichom. Eth., 1111b), Sartre, quite in opposition, 
considers that choices are not at all voluntary acts, as we have seen, and 
considers, moreover, that choices are not the direct result of deliberations. 
For Sartre, deliberations are a reflective justification a person gives to her 
choice. Justification appears only when choice is already made. 
3. While Aristotle holds a set of uncreated values, rooted in human 
nature, for Sartre there are no a priori values, in the same way that there is 
not a human essence or a human nature. Values are a human creation in the 
effort to perform a project of being able to give a raison-d’-être to the 
contingent existence. Consequently, we could say that while in Aristotle 
choice is moved by a certain frame of values, with Sartre choosing is like 
practising a free-falling sport. 
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Nevertheless, under a certain point of view, we still are able to attempt 
an approach of Sartre’s perspectives to Aristotelian ethics. In fact, in spite of 
Sartre’s refusal to consider the central concepts of “bad-faith”, “angst”, 
“responsibility”, “authenticity” as ethical concepts in L’Être et le néant, and 
in spite of his famous final remarks on the need, after L’Être et le néant, to 
carry out ethical research, those very same concepts of “bad-faith”, “angst”, 
“responsibility”, “authenticity” have a strong and unavoidable ethical 
relevance. Specifically, the revelation of a certain manner of being and of 
acting, call it authenticity or otherwise, make it relevant; but what truly is at 
stake here is one type of character instead of another, and not an ethics based 
on the principle of rule obedience. In other words, instead of an ethical 
evaluation of acts in themselves or of consequences, as with Kantian and 
utilitarian ethics respectively, for Sartre there is an undeniable ethical 
relevance presumed in his considerations on the character of a subject. And, 
in this sense, there is a sort of ethics of virtue, even if it is radically different 
from the Aristotelian proposal. 
One commentator – Jonathan Webber (European Journal of 
Philosophy, 14, 1, 2006) – drew attention to this aspect and did it with              
such emphasis that his paper on the subject has the title “Sartre’s theory                 
of character”. Webber remarks:  
“Though he rarely uses the terms ‘personality’, ‘character’, or ‘trait’, these 
notions are at the heart of his philosophical, political, biographical, and 
fictional writings.” (Webber 2006: 94).  
 
Under this perspective, the huge importance of characters in Sartre’s 
plays obviously achieves a whole ethical significance that must be attended 
to carefully. That is exemplified, for instance, in the character confrontation 
among the three main characters of the famous Sartre play Huis Clos. Joseph 
Garcin, Inès Serrano and Estelle Rigault find themselves at the farthest 
horizon of the moral and existential judgment of each other, and of each one 
towards him or herself. If the conflictual collision expresses something about 
the threatening condition of the presence of others, as it is often remarked, it 
would also be important to show how conflict opens a road along which it 
becomes possible to reach the true character. Moreover, reaching such a true 
character (le vrai caractère) is to achieve an understanding of the project 
that singularises a person. In short, her original choice. That articulation 
between character and project is explicitly pointed out in Webber’s paper: 
“Sartre’s early view is rather that character traits do not determine 
behaviour, and are within the agent’s control. Character traits, on this view, 
ultimately result from the projects one has chosen to pursue in life, and since 
one can change these projects one can change one’s character traits.” (Webber, 
2006: 98) 
 
After all these important aspects, and simply as a side comment, I would 
remark that I do not agree with Webber that Sartre’s early view, being 
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replaced by the Critique de la raison dialectique view, was rejected “as an 
inappropriate description of the ways in which projects and hence character 
traits are adopted and revised” (p. 98). On the contrary, I believe there is a 
strong solidarity between the two periods, attested to by the continuous 
prevalence of freedom as core concept in Sartre’s philosophy. I do however 
agree with Webber’s claim that there is at least continuity in “his theory of 
the relation between character traits and projects” (ibidem). 
 
 
IX. Conclusion: the duty of character 
 
Somehow, even from a Kantian perspective, there is a sensitive issue 
around the character. Following the categorical imperative should be a rule 
assimilated by moral agents as a trait of their character. We could put this 
idea in very simple terms: for Kant, there is a concern in promoting a 
character of duty. But for Sartre, quite the opposite is at stake: not a 
character of duty, but a duty of character. Not in the sense of a certain 
character instead of another – of course there are bad characters – but rather 
in the sense that radical investment in pursuing a choice, undertaking a 
project, and developing a singular character is fundamentally an ethical 
realisation. Perhaps this is just wishful thinking, but it is also probably the 
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